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DUTIES ANIMALS:�TO  
RAWLS' ALLEGED LEMMA�DI  
In his spirited paper, "Duties to 
Animals: Rawls' Dilemma,"l, Tom 
Regan accuses Rawls of a fundamental 
equivocation in his moral attitude 
toward animals. Regan contends that 
while Rawls recognizes a natural duty 
not to be cruel to animals, he simulta­
neously holds that only people are 
owed the natural duties of justice. 
But if being a person is necessary 
condition for receiving the duties of 
justice, Regan asks, why isn't it like­
wise a decisive consideration for 
determining entitlement to the natural 
duty of not being harmed? Rawls, 
Regan argues, is faced with the fol­
lowing dilemma: either being a moral 
person is a "decisive consideration for 
determining those to whom we have 
natural duties, "2 or it is not. If the 
former, then Rawls fails to account 
for the acknowledged natural duty not 
to harn animals; but if the latter, 
Rawls has no grounds for denying 
animals the protection of any of the 
other natural duties of justice. Regan 
considers several possible replies that 
might lift Rawls off the horns of this 
purported dilemma, but finds each of 
them lacking. He concludes that 
Rawls can avoid his pointy perch only 
by abandoning either the natural duty 
not to be cruel to animals, or else the 
claim that moral personal ity is the 
basis of entitlement to the natu ral 
duties of justice. Regan argues, of 
cou rse, for the latter. Justice as 
fairness, he suggests, has been nei­
ther just nor fair to animals. They 
have been arbitrarily excluded from 
the protection of Rawls' principles of 
justice. 
Regan's critique, however, is itself 
u nfai r to Rawls. Regan misi nterprets 
a central aspect of Rawls' theory and 
then finds the resulting views 
contradictory. Indeed they are. But 
they are not Rawls' views! In the fol­
lowing comments, I shall therefore 
state what I take to be Regan's mis­
reading of Rawls' statements on the 
rights of animals, and show how a 
clarification of Rawls' views eliminates 
any appearance of self-contradiction. 
, shall also briefly go beyond the 
question of the internal consistency of 
~ Jh~2.D:/_ 91 Justice and suggest the 
way in which a Kantian theory, such 
as Rawls', might account for some of 
the rights of animals which Regan is 
so eager to defend. For I suspect 
that such an extension of a contracta­
rian theory of justice may prove more 
congenial to Regan's own views than 
does the utilitarianism of Peter Singer 
and other out-spoken defenders of 
animal rights. 
Regan's basic argument contends 
that Rawls inconsistently makes the 
following claims: 
(1) We have a natural duty not to 
be cruel to a'limals; 
(2) We do not have a natu ral duty 
of justice to animals, because the duty 
of justice is owed only to persons; 
indeed, 
(3) All natural duties are due only 
to persons. 
(1) and '(3) are obviously inconsis­
tent. But although (2) and (3) are 
plausible interpretations of Rawls' 
views,3 (1) is not. Rawls does not, 
to my knowledg~ ever hold that we 
have a natural duty of non-cruelty to 
animals. To see this, let us cursorily 
review his account of such duties. 
Recall, fi rst of all, that Rawls is 
developing a theory of justice, which 
in his view is a set of principles 
"assigning rights and duties in the 
basic institutions of society" and 
which "define the appropriate distri­
bution of the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation" (p. 4).4 Rawls fur­
ther assumes that he is giving a 
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theory for a "well-ordered society, " 
that is, a "society in which (1) 
everyone accepts and knows that the 
others accept the same principles of 
justice, and (2) the basic social insti­
tutions generally satisfy and are gen­
erally known to satisfy these princi­
pies" (p. 5). Finally, Rawls assumes 
a certain conception of the persons 
that inhabit this well-ordered society. 
He characterizes them as "free," 
"equal," and rational beings (pp. 
11-13, and 241-57), and as "moral 
persons," agents capable of having a 
conception of their good (as expressed 
by a rational plan of life) and who are 
"capable of having (and are assumed 
to acquire) a sense of justice, a nor­
mally effective desire to apply and to 
act upon the principles of justice" (p. 
505). Throughout A Theory of J~­
tice, Rawls insists that the key fea­
tures of his theory, especially the 
central theoretical construction of the 
original position, are explicitly 
designed to represent or to model this 
account of the role of the principles 
of justice in a just society and his 
particular conce~tion of the human 
beings who a re its subjects. 5 The 
principles of justice are therefore cho­
sen by theoretically defined beings, 
rational agents who are carefully 
characterized to incorporate aspects of 
a specific conception of a liberal soci­
ety and its citizens. 
Given this account of the principles 
of social justice, it is not surprising 
that the selection of the principles of 
justice for individuals is similarly con­
strained. As part of his overall 
theory of justice, Rawls specifies two 
groups of principles for individuals, 
the "obligations of fairness" and the 
so-called "natural duties." Only the 
latter is of concern to us now. The 
"natu ral duties" are those moral 
requi rements which it would be 
rational for the parties in the original 
position to impose on all persons, 
irrespective of their volUntary acts 
and their other institutional 
obligations. But given thei r fu nction 
and their theoretical derivation, the 
natural duties are necessarily 
extended only to rational moral 
agents; "they obtain between all as 
equal moral persons" (p. 115). The 
argument of sec. 51, for example, 
attempts to derive the duty to support 
and further just institutions merely 
from the nature of the persons in the 
original position and their desire to 
establish a well-ordered society (p. 
334). Rawls similarly argues for the 
natural duties of mutual respect and 
mutual aid on the ground that they 
are required for our assumed concep­
tion of the person as a moral being 
(pp. 337-9). Even the discussion of 
sec. 19, which lists the natural duty 
not to inflict unnecessary suffering, 
explicitly links natural duties with the 
notion of the equality of moral per­
sonhood and the representation of that 
idea in its derivation from the original 
position (pp. 114-5). Nowhere is 
there any suggestion that we have 
any natural duty to any non-human 
being, nor couJs! such ~ suggestion 
ma ke ~ sense gi'en Rawls I general 
account of the principles of justice for 
individua~s.
Why then does Regan attribute (1) 
to Rawls? Apparently, his entire case 
rests on the single paragraph in 
which Rawls notes that "certainly it is 
wrong to be cruel to animals," and 
that animals' capacities for "feelings of 
pleasure and pain and for the forms 
of life of which <they> are capable 
clearly impose duties of compassion 
and humanity" (p. 512). But the 
whole point of that paragraph (which 
Regan acknowledges in passing) is to 
state that any such duties are "out­
side the scope of the theory of jus­
tice." All that has preceded in A 
Iheory of Justice, especially the sec-:­
77 account of moral personality as the 
"decisive consideration" determining 
entitlement to considerations of jus­
tice, is part of Rawls' theory of jus­
tice. Moreover, the sees. 19 and 51 
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discussions of the principles for indi­
viduals, wh ich specify the natu ral 
duties, are also explicitly included as 
parts of that theory (e.g. pp. 108, 
116, and 333). However, "our con­
duct toward animals," Rawls insists, 
"is not regulated by these principles" 
(p. 504). Regan has apparently 
equated Rawls' statement that we do 
have some duty of non-cruelty to ani­
mals (due to some broad moral or 
metaphysical view that goes beyond a 
theory of justice and about which he 
refuses to speculate) with the claim 
that persons have a .r:!-i!tl.!~ du!y not 
to ha I'm each other. Si nce Rawls 
explicitly denies that these two ideas 
should be equated, and since there is 
nothing in his writings that commits 
him to their equivalence, I conclude 
that Regan wrongly attributes (1) to 
Rawls. Therefore, we need not 
believe that there is anything contra­
dictory in Rawls' views on natural 
duties and the rights of animals. 
II 
In th(; middle part of his paper, 
Regan discusses three replies to 
Rawls' pu rported dilemma (though he 
su rprisi ngly doesn't consider the 
reply wh ich simply shows that Rawls 
does not hold each of the contradic­
tory positions attributed to him). In 
the course of considering (and reject­
ing) these replies, Regan misreads 
Rawls' theory in a way which illumi­
nates his basic problem with the text. 
I shall therefore briefly comment on a 
couple of his arguments. 
One rejected suggestion is that 
animals are denied the protection of 
the principles of justice because 
Rawls' hypothetical contractors know 
that they won 't be an imals and there­
fore have no interest in providing 
protection for them. In his considera­
tion of this suggestion, Regan argues 
that it is illegitimate to specify that 
the contractors know that they are 
and will continue to be human beings, 
for this, he contends would arbitrarily 
prejudice the outcome of their deliber­
ations in favor of one species, and 
thus run "counter to what the 'veil of 
ignorance' is supposed to accom­
plish." 6 But Regan here misinter­
prets the primary function of the veil 
of ignorance, for its basic role is not 
to guarantee the impartiality of the 
chosen principles, but rather to theo­
retically represent certain Kantian 
notions concerning the nature of moral 
principles and agents. In particular 
it is designed to model the Kantian 
idea of a categorical imperative, a 
principle that would be autonomously 
chosen by free and equal rational 
be!ngs who merely regard themselves 
as such and who seek to express that 
natu re in thei I' choices. Th us, the 
function of the "veil-of-ignorance" is 
to insure that "the parties are not to 
be influenced by any particular infor­
mation that is not pa rt of thei I' . rep re­
sentation as free moral persons with a 
determinate (but unknown) conception 
of the good." 7 Regan's contention 
that the parties in the original posi­
tion should wei~h the possibility that 
they might be (or actually are) ani­
mals significantly misinterprets this 
most fundamental aspect of Rawls' 
thought. 
Regan does anticipate an objection 
"that the supposition that any person 
in the original position could becme a 
non-human animal would render the 
very point of the original position 
incoherent. "8 The argument given in 
support of this claim is not, however, 
the one just adduced. Regan's imagi­
nary interlocutor observes that the 
principles of justice serve to govern 
the distribution of harms and benefits 
to those who are possible beneficiar­
ies, that is, beings capable of being 
helped or harmed or of having a good 
or bad life. Since animals presumably 
are incapable of such individual wel­
fare, they are not fit subjects for the 
principles of justice. Regan has, I 
believe, a telling reply to this 
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argument. Since many "higher ani­
mals" clearly have desi res and prefer­
ences, memories and beliefs, and since 
they obviously have a psychophysical 
identity over time, it makes perfectly 
good sense to speak of them faring ill 
or well and consequently of having a 
good or bad life. But Regan's dis­
cussion is once again inadequate as a 
critique of Rawls' understanding of 
the nature an-a--purpose of the original 
position. S The purpose of· his con­
tractors is not simply to fu rther thei I' 
own well-being, but rather to estab­
lish a mode of existence that best 
expresses and preserves thei r natu re 
as free and equal rational beings. 
Since such moral persons are, by def­
inition, those who can have a sense of 
justice and who are capable of formu­
lating and revising a rational plan of 
life, it makes no sense to entertain 
the thought of parties in the original 
position who are not rational beings. 
III 
Rawls' theory of justice, as I have 
defended it, is based on a particular 
conception of the moral agent. Such 
a being must have the potential for 
acting from a sense-of-justice and 
must be capable of formulating and 
pursuing a rational life plan. The 
scope of the protection of the princi­
ples of justice is therefore necessarily 
limited to rational moral agents. But 
need such beings be limited to human 
beings? Couldn't some of Regan's 
"higher animals" minimally qualify as 
rational beings of the requisite sort, 
such that they would be directly enti­
tled to the protection of all of the 
principles of justice? I do not see 
why not. 
Suppose that we were to learn that 
dolphins, for example, have a sense 
of their own identity, have a concep­
tion of their own good, recognize and 
act from general principles of mutually 
advantageous social behavior, and so 
on. (Such speculation is not 
implausible given the actual recorded 
behavior of these mammals.) They 
might even have a higher-order inter­
est in primary goods, such as liberty, 
which they recognize as a necessary 
means for achieving their more partic­
ular desires. Were these claims shown 
to be the case, a Rawlsian-Kantian 
view would necessarily extend the 
principles of justice to cover these 
animals, for there would no longer be 
any non-arbitrary way to exclude 
them from the original position. Thei r 
unusual bodies, strange language, and 
peculiar conceptions of the good would 
be just as morally irrelevant as the 
racial, linguistic, and idiosyncratic 
behavioral differences amongst human 
bei ngs. Moreover, even if for some 
reason the dolphins could not press 
their claims to just treatment (due 
perhaps to their linguistic deficien­
cies), human agents would have natu­
ral duties to respect and protect their 
rights, just as we now owe these 
duties to infants and the temporarily 
verbally incapacitated. 
I conclude with the suggestion that 
considerations similar to the ones just 
mentioned may account for Regan's 
intuitions concerning our duties to the 
higher animals, though unfortunately 
he stresses the animals' abilities 
merely to have "good lives" rather 
than their similarities to rational 
agents. I suspect, however, though 
unfortunately I cannot pursue the idea 
further in the present paper, that 
extending this line of argument (by, 
for example, showing that higher ani­
mals differ from human beings only in 
the degree to which they are moral 
agents in the Kantian sense) would 
better support whatever rights are 
properly attributable to animals than 
would any kind of utilitarianism. 
Regan himself has effectively shown 
the defects of the latter view. 
therefore urge him to turn his consid­
erable philosophical talents to a more 
sympathetic and fai I' treatment of the 
contractarian tradition. 
Alan E. Fuchs 
College of William and Mary 
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NOTES 
lThis journal, pp. 76-82. 
2Regan, p. 77. 
3These characterizations of Rawls' 
positions purposely oversimplify his 
views so as to make Regan's point as 
strong as possible. We should note, 
however, (as Regan himself concedes) 
that in A Theor~ 2f )~~.!ice Rawls 
rega rds the capacity for moral person­-
aity only as a sufficient condition for 
receiving justice. "Whether moral 
personality is also a necessary condi­-
tion I shall leave aside (p. 506)." 
Nevertheless, I will follow Regan in 
treati ng it as a necessa ry condition, 
or, as he frequently states it, the 
"decisive consideration." Similarly I 
shall ignore Regan's distinction 
between Rawls' "strong" and "weak" 
positions, since if Rawls can be 
defended while holding the stronger 
thesis, he is surely exculpated on the 
weaker view as well. 
4Rawls, A The~ (Cam­of )ustts:e -
bridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971). Page references in the text 
are to this edition. 
sThis argument IS even more 
explicitly developed in Rawls' recent 
articles, particularly his "Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory," The 
Journal of Philbsophy LXXVII (1980), 
pp. 516-517, 520-522, and 525. See 
also my "Fairness to Justice as Fair­-
ness," in H. Miller and W. Williams, 
eds., The Limits of Utilitarianism 
(Min neapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1982). 
6 Regan, p. 78. 
7 Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism," 
p. 459. See also A Theory of ~_us-
tice, sec. 40 
--SRegan, p. 78. 
9Here, as throughout my note, I 
am merely considering Regan's criti­-
cism of Rawls as internally contradic­-
tory. It suffices, therefore, to show 
that Regan has misinterpreted Rawls. 
I do not contend that Regan may not 
have independent reasons for rejecting 
Rawls' views on duties to animals. 
